This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the e¤ects of one-sided tari¤ cuts on …rms' export product scope. The theoretical model explicitly incorporates cost of management in addition to the commonly used production cost. Firms are heterogeneous in terms of managerial e¢ ciency but homogenous in terms of production productivity. The analysis predicts that the home country's tari¤ cut reduces all home …rms' export product scope, whereas in response to the foreign country's tari¤ cut, a home …rm's export product scope expands (shrinks) if the …rm's management cost is low (high). These predictions are supported by our empirical analysis based on data on Chinese …rms from 2000 to 2006.
Introduction
Multiproduct …rms contribute a large percent to production and international trade in the global economy.
These …rms frequently adjust their product scope in response to changes in the economic environment and policies (Bernard et al., 2009 ). Product scope adjustments a¤ect a …rm's and an industry's average productivity (Bernard et al., 2010 and . Recent literature on multiproduct …rms has increased our understanding of …rms'adjustment in response to trade liberalization (see the most recent discussion by Qiu and Zhou, 2013) .
However, our knowledge about this issue is far from complete. This paper addresses such issue by examining how …rms that di¤er in managerial e¢ ciency adjust their export product scope (the number of products exported ), which is di¤erent from the total product scope (the number of products produced ), in response to one-sided trade liberalization, namely, domestic tari¤ or foreign tari¤ cut.
Some discrepancies exist between theoretical and empirical literature on multiproduct …rms and trade. First, almost all existing theoretical models analyze how multiproduct …rms adjust their product scope in response to globalization, which is represented by bilateral (or two-sided) trade liberalization. In reality, although multilat- to a …rm's pro…t from each product. Although existing theoretical studies focus on the e¤ects of two-sided trade liberalization on …rms'adjustment in product scope, they all appear to suggest that the qualitative e¤ects of one-sided trade liberalization on all …rms with high or low productivity are similar. However, empirical studies (e.g., Dhingra, 2013) show that …rms respond di¤erently. In this paper, we argue that …rms di¤er not only in production productivity, but also in many other aspects, such as managerial e¢ ciency. Firm heterogeneity in management cost could generate results di¤erent from …rm heterogeneity in production cost. 1 1 Nocke and Yeaple (2014) introduced two dimensions of …rm heterogeneity: organizational capital and organizational e¢ ciency. These two types of capability result in a trade-o¤ between producing more products with lower productivity and producing less products with higher productivity. Managerial e¢ ciency is very di¤erent from organizational capability.
Our model, which focuses on …rm heterogeneity in managerial e¢ ciency, assumes that …rms are homogeneous in terms of production productivity. Speci…cally, domestic …rms are of two types, e¢ cient ones with low management cost and ine¢ cient ones with high management cost. All …rms produce multiple products and employ the same production structure for their products. Every …rm has a core competency and faces increasing marginal costs of production for its other products. In addition, introducing each new product at the …rm level incurs a …xed cost. A product will be produced if the …xed cost of product introduction is lower than the sum of the pro…t derived from the domestic market and that derived from the foreign market. The home country's tari¤ cut increases competition in the domestic market and thus reduces a domestic …rm's pro…t from all its products. Marginal products are no longer pro…table to be produced, and consequently, each domestic …rm reduces its total product scope. If the total product scope of a …rm is reduced to a large extent, the products available for exports are also reduced. Therefore, our model predicts that a drastic domestic tari¤ cut reduces a …rm's export product scope.
A …rm decides its optimal export product scope such that its marginal product of export (de…ned as the least productive product exported) earns zero pro…t from the foreign market. This zero pro…t condition implies that all …rms'marginal products of export have the same unit cost, which is the sum of production cost and management costs. Thus, an e¢ cient …rm's marginal product has a higher production cost than that of an ine¢ cient. Foreign tari¤ cuts exert two e¤ects on each product exported by a domestic …rm. First, a reduction in the iceberg-type foreign tari¤ lowers the marginal costs of production of all the home country's export products by the same percentage. This phenomenon can be considered an individual shock (positive) because products with di¤erent marginal costs of production face di¤erent cost reductions in the absolute term. As a result, an e¢ cient …rm's marginal product receives a larger reduction (in the absolute term) than that of an ine¢ cient …rm.
Second, all the home country's export products lower their prices because of cost reducation and thus makes the foreign market competition tougher. This can be considered as a common shock (negative) to all products.
Our analysis shows that under certain conditions, the positive individual shock outweighs the negative common shock for the marginal products of e¢ cient …rms; however, the opposite is true for the marginal products of ine¢ cient …rms. Consequently, e¢ cient …rms expand their export product scope in response to foreign tari¤ cuts, whereas ine¢ cient …rms reduce theirs.
An empirical analysis based on Chinese …rms'export product scope data from 2000 to 2006 was conducted in this study. The results con…rm the theoretical prediction: in response to Chinese tari¤ cuts, Chinese …rms reduce their export product scope; in response to foreign tari¤ cuts, Chinese …rms with low management costs expand their export product scope, whereas those with high management costs reduce theirs.
The present study di¤ers from existing ones in literature in many ways. As pointed out earlier, the present study focuses on the e¤ect of one-sided trade liberalization as opposed to bilateral trade liberalization. More importantly, this study introduces managerial e¢ ciency as a source of …rm heterogeneity and shows that this heterogeneity, rather than heterogeneity in production productivity, di¤erentiates the responses of …rms to foreign countries'trade liberalization. The importance of managerial e¢ ciency and its di¤erence from production productivity have been emphasized in management science literature. For example, Gort and Lee (2003) utilized American industrial data and found that managerial e¢ ciency contributes substantially to the total factor productivity (TFP) in American manufacturing sectors. They identi…ed three sources of managerial e¢ ciency, namely, superior initial managerial endowments, the accumulation of managerial knowledge through learning, and the impact of an e¤ective market for managerial resources internal to the …rm. These sources of managerial e¢ ciency are di¤erent from a …rm's production productivity.
In the theoretical literature of multiproduct …rms, all studies assume …rm heterogeneity in production productivity and most, with the exception of Nocke and Yeaple (2014) and Qiu and Zhou (2013) , predict that in response to bilateral trade liberalization, all …rms (less productive and more productive) reduce their product scope (Arkolakis and Muendler, 2011; Baldwin and Gu, 2009; Bernard et al., 2011; Dhingra, 2013; Eckel and Neary, 2010; Feenstra and Ma, 2008) . Qiu and Zhou (2013) showed that with an increasing …xed cost of product introduction, the marginal products of …rms acquire di¤erent productivities; thus, …rms may adjust their product scope in response to trade liberalization in the opposite directions. 2 The present study does not rely on the assumption of increasing …xed cost of product introduction to show that …rms with di¤erent managerial e¢ ciencies may still exhibit opposite responses to foreign tari¤ cuts even though they have the same production productivity.
Not all existing studies are about the e¤ects of bilateral trade liberalization. The implications of one-sided trade liberalization can be obtained from the study of Mayer et al. (2013) . The main result of Mayer et al.'s (2013) study indicates that in tough markets, the production distribution of …rms is skewed towards their core competencies and …rms reduce their product scope. A foreign tari¤ cut suggests that the foreign market has become less tough and thus more pro…table to exporting …rms. A direct implication of this result to our model is as follows: extremely tough competition in the domestic market (because of domestic tari¤ cuts) induces all domestic …rms to reduce the set of produced products, and minimal competition in the export market (because of foreign tari¤ cuts) induces all exporters to expand the set of exported products. This implication is con…rmed in our model without …rm heterogeneity in managerial e¢ ciency. However, a tari¤ cut in the foreign market has both cost (positive for exporters) and competition (negative) e¤ects. These e¤ects are di¤erent for …rms with di¤erent managerial e¢ ciencies; thus …rms adjust their export product scope di¤erently.
Existing empirical studies on multiproduct …rms generally found that trade liberalization has signi…cant e¤ects on …rms' product scope choice. Despite the fact that most theoretical studies focus on bilateral trade liberalization, many empirical studies highlight unilateral trade liberalization. Dhingra (2013) showed that from 2003 to 2006 in Thailand, less export-oriented domestic …rms increased their product lines in response to a unilateral tari¤ cut, whereas more export-oriented domestic …rms reduced their product lines. Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) documented the phenomenon of product "churning" among Mexican …rms as a result of improved access to foreign markets, that is, a substantial number of Mexican …rms discontinued several existing products and simultaneously developed new products for export. Goldberg et al. (2010) showed that from 1989 to 2003 when intensive trade and other reforms took place in India, Indian …rms added more product lines than what they discontinued; the discontinuance was unrelated to tari¤ reduction. Empirical studies on bilateral or multilateral trade liberalization include those of Baldwin and Gu (2009), Bernard et al. (2011) , and Berthou and Fontagne (2011). 3 Previous empirical …ndings are far from complete or conclusive. The empirical …ndings of the present study contributes to literature. Chinese exporters' data were utilized to examine the e¤ects of tari¤ cuts in China and foreign countries on export product scope. The results show that managerial e¢ ciency is important in determining the extent to which …rms adjust their export product scope. 4 The present study is also related to a recent one by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) in that both emphasize the importance of the other aspects of …rm heterogeneity, in addition to heterogenous productivity.
As Caliendo and Ross-Hansberg (2012) pointed out, a …rm is merely a technology to produce goods at a given marginal cost. In reality, a …rm has many facets aside from its production technology. Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) added organization structure to …rms; we introduce management dimension to …rms. Moreover, Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) assumed that …rms are heterogeneous with respect to demand for their products to show the importance of the other aspects of …rms; we assume that …rms are heterogenous in terms of their managerial e¢ ciency. These added features of …rms enrich our understanding of …rms' responses to globalization. 5 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, Chinese data are ustilized to conduct a preliminary empirical analysis on Chinese …rms'response to trade liberalization without di¤erentiating them by managerial e¢ ciency. The theoretical model with …rm heterogeneity in managerial e¢ ciency is introduced in Section 3, and an equilibrium analysis is conducted to derive results related to the e¤ects of trade liberalization on …rms' 3 Baldwin and Gu (2009) found that tari¤ cuts between 1973 and 1997 induced scope contraction in small or non-exporting Canadian …rms, but had no e¤ect on large or exporting …rms. Bernard et al. (2011) demonstrated that U.S. …rms exposed to numerous tari¤ reductions under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement reduced the number of products they produced relative to …rms exposed to only a few tari¤ reductions. Berthou and Fontagne (2011) found that after the eurozone was established in 1999, productive French …rms increased their export product scope in the eurozone destinations, whereas slightly productive French …rms reduced their export product scope. 4 Manova and Zhang (2013) also employed Chinese data to explore the behavior of multiproduct …rms. An important feature of their study is the linkage between multiple products and multiple quality level. Eckel et al.'s (2011) study on Mexican …rms also has the same feature. 5 Nocke and Yeaple (2014) also introduced …rm another dimension of heterogeneity in addition to production productivity. export product scope. Chinese data are employed in Section 4 to test the main theoretical predictions. Section 5 provides the concluding remarks.
Preliminary Empirical Analysis
The …rst empirical analysis on Chinese …rms'export product scope adjustment in response to the reduction in trade costs is conducted in this section.
Estimation Framework and Measures
A …rm's total product scope is de…ned in this study as the total number of products that the …rm produces and sells to the markets (either domestic or foreign). Export product scope is de…ned as the total number of products that the …rm sells to the foreign market. A …rm's export product scope is mainly determined by the pro…tability of a …rm's products in the foreign market, which in turn is a¤ected by many factors, including GDP, productivity, and trade costs. A …rm's domestic market pro…tability a¤ects its total product scope, which may or may not be related to total product scope.
We focus on two explanatory variables to determine how changes in trade costs a¤ect a Chinese …rm's export product scope. The …rst variable is the home country's import tari¤s (referred to as home tari¤ and denoted by HT hereafter), and the second one is the foreign countries'import tari¤s (referred to as foreign tari¤ and denoted by FT hereafter). Accordingly, the following empirical equation is established.
where e it is …rm i's export product scope, T F P it is …rm i'total factor productivity, HT it is the home (Chinese) tari¤ level faced by …rm i, and F T it is the foreign tari¤ level faced by …rm i (all in year t). it is a vector of control variables, including …rm i's export market size (foreign countries'GDP), ownership type (state-owned enterprise, multinational …rm, or others), and trade mode (processing or ordinary trade).
Although a country has many tari¤ lines, tari¤s that are not relevant to a particular …rm may not have a strong impact on the …rm's export product scope. Hence, we construct …rm-speci…c tari¤ to better evaluate the e¤ects of tari¤ changes on …rms' export product scope. For home tari¤s, suppose that …rm i produces a set of products, S i , for the domestic market. The …rm's pro…t will be a¤ected directly by all tari¤ lines in this product set. A tari¤ line will have a signi…cant e¤ect if the …rm has a larger share of the corresponding product in its total domestic sales. This condition suggests that a …rm-speci…c tari¤ should be the average of all relevant tari¤s weighted by the share of each product's sales. However, data on product-level domestic sales are unavailable. Thus, we adopt a less satisfactory approach by using the share of a …rm's export to substitute the share of its domestic sales, as in Yu (2013). Speci…cally, we introduce the following measure as …rm i's home tari¤:
where E it is the set of …rm i's export products, X k it is the export sales of product k by …rm i, and k t is the home country's ad valorem tari¤ on product k (all in year t). Such a measure faces some possible caveats which will be discussed later.
The construction of …rm-speci…c foreign tari¤s is more complicated than the construction of home tari¤s because …rms not only export multiple products, but also export them to multiple countries, with di¤erent subsets of products for di¤erent countries. The following measure of F T it is proposed in this study to capture the relative importance of the di¤erent tari¤s of foreign countries.
where kc t is product k's ad valorem tari¤ imposed by country c, X kc it is the value of …rm i's export of product k to country c, X k it = P c2C X c ikt , and C it are the sets of countries where …rm i has exports (all in year t). The ratio X kc it =X k it represents the share of …rm i's product k exported to country c; it captures the relative importance of kc t in a¤ecting …rm i's product k export. Thus,
) kc t is the weighted average of foreign tari¤s on product k for …rm i.
We then address T F P it . Although many methods can be employed to measure a …rm's TFP, or productivity, we adopt the Olley-Pakes (1996) approach to estimate each Chinese …rm's TFP (referred to as TFP1). We modify the standard Olley-Pakes approach to better re ‡ect the reality in China. First, following Feenstra et al. (2013), we use de ‡ated output and input prices at the …rm-product level to measure TFP. Second, we use real capital depreciation to construct a …rm's real investment (the perpetual inventory method). 6 Third, we consider the e¤ect of China's WTO accession in 2001 and the processing behavior of …rms in TFP realization.
A detailed description of the augmented Olley-Pakes TFP measures is provided in Appendix C. We also employ other measures of TFP to verify the robustness of the results. 7 6 Firm-level data only provide the book value of each …rm's capital stock. The original value of each …rm's capital stock must be obtained for TFP estimation. To do so, we adopt the following expression: At = Ao 
Data and Summary Statistics
Regression (1) and construction of HT, FT and TFP require extensive information. Thus, we employ three highly disaggregate panel datasets: product-level tari¤ data of every country, …rm-level production data of Chinese …rms, and …rm and product-level trade data of Chinese …rms. A brief discription of these datasets is provided below, and detailed discussions are provided in Appendix A.
Tari¤s. The WTO o¢ cial webpage shows th tari¤s of all WTO member countries/regions at HS six-digit level. 8 The dataset includes the following tari¤ data for each product category: number of ad valorem (AV) 9 The CME dataset contains information on more than 100 …nancial variables obtained from each …rm's accounting statement. However, the dataset has obvious omissions and errors. Following Feenstra et al. (2013) , we clean the dataset as follows. We eliminate the observations (i.e., …rms) wherein some key …nancial variables (such as total assets, net value of …xed assets, sales, and gross value of industrial output) are missing, or the number of employees is less than eight. 10 According to the basic rules of the generally accepted accounting principles, we also omit the observations wherein (i) liquid assets are larger than total assets, (ii) total …xed assets are larger than total assets, (iii) the net value of …xed assets is larger than the total assets, (iv) the …rm's identi…cation number is missing, or (v) the …rm's establishment time is invalid.
Export data. China's General Administration of Customs maintains a highly disaggregate trade database wherein each international trade transaction is recorded. The database contains a large variety of information about each trading …rm, including each export product's price, quantity, value, and destination. Product information is available at the HS eight-digit level. We use this database to calculate each Chinese …rm's export product scope and construct the weights for HT and F T for each …rm. Several …rms export products that 8 Data can be accessed at http://tari¤data.wto.org/ReportersAndProducts.aspx. TRAINS data generally have missing values, particularly data on the tari¤s imposed by other countries on Chinese exports. The product-destination-year combinations that have missing tari¤s are thus eliminated. 9 The aggregate data for the manufacturing sector in the annual China's Statistical Yearbook are compiled from the CME dataset. 1 0 The reason for selecting eight workers as the threshold is that …rms with less than eight workers fall under a di¤erent legal regime, as mentioned in Brandt et al. (2012) . We adopt this criterion because a very small company may not have a good accounting/reporting system. However, our results are not sensitive to this critical level. belong to more than one industry. Considering that our focus is on within-industry multiproduct analysis, we assign a …rm to an industry at HS 2-digit level, in which the …rm has the most number of export products.
Our study requires the merging of the Customs and CME datasets. Matching the two datasets is challenging because they use completely di¤erent …rm-identi…cation systems. As in Yu (2013), by using the …rms'Chinese names, zip codes, and telephone numbers, we are able to match 76,946 …rms, which account for more than 40% of the manufacturing …rms reported in the CME dataset and approximately 53% of the export value reported in the Customs dataset. 11 This representation is comparable to that of Bernard et al. (2009) for US data and Wang and Yu (2012) for Chinese data.
The summary statistics are reported in Table 1 . Tables 1A and 1B show that export product scope has a very large variation: The minimum of export product scope is 1 (i.e., a single product), whereas the maximum is 527, with the mean equal to 6.49. Approximately 79% of the Chinese …rms (in our merged dataset) exported more than a single product from 2000 to 2006 and accounted for 91.4% of the total exports. Moreover, approximately two-thirds of the …rms exported less than 5 products, 90% exported less than 15 products, and only 5% exported more than 25 products. Table 1C , China's home tari¤s (measured at both industry and …rm levels) declined by approximately 50% from 2000 to 2006, whereas foreign tari¤s (measured at the …rm level) decreased by 17%.
As shown in
[ Table 1 ]
Estimates
The estimation results from the same regression model (1) can di¤er both quantitatively and qualitatively depending on our assumption of the distribution of the dependent variable. We …rst assume a normal distribution.
The OLS regression estimates are shown in Table 2 . Both home and foreign tari¤s are positively associated with …rms'export product scope. This result suggests that …rms reduce their export product scope in response to both home and foreign tari¤ cuts. Our data clearly show that most of the …rms export a small number of products, and only a few of them export a very large number of products. This result suggests that the dependent variable does not follow a normal distribution. Thus, the OLS result reported in column (1) of Table   2 could be biased.
[ Table 2] Our dependent variable, export product scope, is a non-negative count number. Thus, the use of count-data estimates would be more reliable (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) . Given that Poisson distribution is the most popular discrete distribution used to capture the characteristics of various count data, we also calculate the Poisson estimate (with a clustered robust standard error). Speci…cally, the dependent variable is assumed to have a probability function f (e; ) = exp( ) e e! ; where = exp(X 0 ) and X denotes the vector of independent variables. The regression results are shown in column (2) of Table 2 . The main results obtained from OLS remain valid qualitatively. Both home and foreign tari¤s have positive and signi…cant e¤ects on export product scope.
Although Poisson distribution is the most popular approach for count data, it may not provide the best representation of our sample distribution. If our sample follows a Poisson distribution, then the mean and variance of a …rm's export product scope should be identical and equal to . However, our data reveals that the variance of the sample (var(e) = 96:9) is approximately 15 times larger than its mean ( e = 6:5) and thus indicate that Poisson distribution does not provide a good representation of our data. Moreover, our test of the goodness of …t for the Poisson model reports an extremely large 2 value (607,445), which again con…rms the inappropriateness of Poisson distribution for our dependent variable.
We then resort to negative binomial distribution because it allows the sample to exhibit a pattern of overdispersion. 12 In fact, when drawing a graph based on the proportion of …rms with di¤erent export product scope (see Figure 1 ), we notice that the negative binomial distribution approximates the observed distribution much better than the Poisson distribution. Since around 80% of the exporters have export product scope less than 10, we assume 10 as the maximum value of the discrete level. 13 We report the negative binomial regression results in column (3) of Table 2 . We …nd that the over-dispersion parameter generated by the likelihood ratio test is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero (we obtain = :660 from the regression), indicating that negative binomial distribution is a good probabilistic representative of our data. 14 The coe¢ cients of both home and foreign tari¤s are positive and statistically signi…cant. We include year-speci…c …xed e¤ects in the regressions because several other time-variant variables, such as exchange rate, may a¤ect the …rms'optimal export product scope. We also include …rm-speci…c …xed e¤ects to control the e¤ects of …rm-invariant variables, such as …rm location. 15 The …xed-e¤ect negative binomial estimates are presented in column (4) of Table 2 . The coe¢ cients of home and foreign tari¤s are again positive and highly signi…cant. When year …xed e¤ect is introduced, another control variable, China's GDP, is dropped out automatically.
[ Figure 1 ] 1 2 The probability density function of negative binomial distribution has the following form:
f (e; ) =
, where = exp(X 0 ) and ( ) is the Gamma function.
All estimates in Table 2 show that more-productive …rms have a larger export product scope. This …nding supports the prediction of existing theoretical studies on multiproduct …rms using Chinese data. Gravity models indicate that the GDP of two trading countries has positive e¤ects on bilateral trade ‡ows. We obtain some e¤ects of gravity on export product scope. On the one hand, we …nd that the GDP of foreign countries increases the export product scope of Chinese …rms. To better evaluate the e¤ects of foreign countries'GDP, we construct and use …rm-speci…c GDP in our analysis by using the share of a …rm's export to each country as the weight of the corresponding importing country's GDP. On the other hand, the e¤ect of China's GDP on the export product scope of Chinese …rms is insigni…cant (with an erratic sign). This e¤ect is not be emphasized in our analysis because it will be automatically eliminated when …rm-speci…c and year-speci…c …xed e¤ects are controlled. We also obtain the following observations: (1) a …rm's capital-labor ratio has a negative e¤ect on its export product scope; (2) SOEs have larger export product scopes than non-SOE with other things equal;
and (3) …rms that engage in processing trade have smaller export product scopes than other …rms, i.e., those that only engage in ordinary trade. 16 Four important caveats relate to home tari¤s. First, two groups of …rms are special. Pure domestic …rms do not have any exports; thus, their export product scope (zero) is insensitive to changes in home and foreign tari¤s. By contrast, pure exporting …rms have no domestic sales; thus, home tari¤s do not have any e¤ect on their export product scope. We omit these two groups of …rms from the sample to obtain better results. The regression results are shown in column (5) of Table 2 . All the coe¢ cients are very close to their counterparts in column (4). This result implies that omitting them from the sample does not change our estimation results.
Second, HT it disregards tari¤s on intermediate goods. Consequently, changes in the intermediate goods'
tari¤s will a¤ect the …nal goods'pro…ts, which then a¤ect the …rm's decision on the total product and export product scopes of the …nal goods. Trade liberalization in …nal goods is often accompanied by trade liberalization in intermediate goods. Hence, the cost e¤ects associated with tari¤ changes on intermediate goods must be controlled. Therefore, we include "home input tari¤s" as an additional independent variable. Processing imports are duty-free in China; hence, even …rms that import the same set of inputs may face di¤erent e¤ective tari¤s.
This phenomenon makes it more di¢ cult to construct …rm-speci…c "home input tari¤s." Given that a …rm can engage in both processing and non-processing imports, we adopt the index of …rm-speci…c input tari¤s (F IT it ) suggested by Yu (2013) as our "home input tari¤s" for …rm. The index is as follows:
where m k i;initial_year is value of …rm i's imports of product k in the …rst year the …rm appears in the sample, P i is the set of …rm i's processing imports, O i is the set of …rm i's non-processing imports, and O i [ P i = M i is the set of the …rm's total imports. The set of processing imports does not appear in (4) because processing imports are duty-free. A …rm's input tari¤ is constructed with time-invariant weights to avoid the well-known endogeneity of weighted tari¤s; that is, imports are negatively associated with tari¤s. Following Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), we measure the import weight of each product based on data on the …rm's …rst year in the sample. Table 3 shows the negative binomial estimates when "home input tari¤s" is included as a control variable. Trade liberalization in intermediate goods imports lowers export product scope. This result is counterintuitive. However, the result is reversed for less-integrated …rms. In any case, the inclusion of such a control variable does not alter the e¤ects and signi…cance of the two key variables, that is, home tari¤s and foreign tari¤s of the …nal goods.
[ Table 3 ]
The third caveat is that in constructing HT it , we assume that the share of each product a …rm sells in the domestic market is the same as that in the foreign market. This is de…nitely untrue, but we would not be able to solve the problem directly because of data limitations. We eliminate the pure domestic and pure exporting …rms from the sample to address this problem in part because these two types of …rms violate the aforementioned assumption to the largest degree. We also perform the following auxiliary regressions to verify the robustness of the main results. China holds an important position in global supply chains (GSCs), and di¤erent …rms engage in GSCs at di¤erent degrees (Yu, 2013). As a result, the di¤erences between their sales distribution in the domestic market and that in foreign markets are also di¤erent. We classify all two-digit Chinese industries into two groups, namely, less integrated and more integrated, according to their "production depth" of engaging in GSCs, which is measured by the ratio of value-added to gross industrial output (OECD, 2010). The division line is the mean of the production depth ratio across industries. We then run the regressions separately for these two groups and obtain the estimates in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 . These two groups have di¤erent degrees of approximation to the "equal share" assumption; however, we …nd that for both the less-integrated group and more-integrated group, home and foreign tari¤s have the same qualitative results (sign and signi…cance) as in the main model. Hence, our main …ndings are not sensitive to the "equal share" assumption.
The last caveat is that HT it does not include tari¤s on products that …rm i does not produce. When there is a change in the tari¤s on products that a …rm does not produce but is competing with, the pro…ts of the …rm's existing products and those the …rm may potentially produce will be a¤ected. Consequently, the …rm's decision on its total product and export product scopes. The reason is obvious. Suppose that a …rm produces products x and y and product z's tari¤ experiences a large reduction. Poducing z then becomes pro…table for the …rm. However, if the …rm produces z, its pro…t from existing products may decrease (e.g., drawing resources away from production of existing products). Thus, the total product scope may expand or shrink, depending on how a¤ected the existing products'pro…ts are. We adopt an industry-wide, as opposed to …rm-speci…c, tari¤ to replace HT it and capture this e¤ect. The regression results are presented column (5) of Table 3 . The coe¢ cients of both home and foreign tari¤s are positive and signi…cant.
Lastly, tari¤ changes may induce a new entry. The export product scopes of new entrants may di¤er signi…cantly from those of the incumbents. In this case, the estimate may not re ‡ect the actual e¤ects of tari¤ changes on existing …rms'export product scope because it also includes the new entrants'export product scope.
We run a balanced panel regression to separte these e¤ects and report the results in column (4) of Table 3 . The sign and signi…cance of the home tari¤ e¤ects do not change.
Role of Firm Heterogeneity in Productivity
The general conclusion from Table 3 is that Chinese …rms would reduce their export scope in response to home and foreign tari¤ cuts. As Qiu and Zhou (2013) pointed out, existing theoretical studies and empirical …ndings show that heterogeneous …rms with di¤erent productivities may or may not respond to trade liberalization in the same manner with regard to their product scope adjustment. This issue is investigated with Chinese data in the present study. We divide all …rms into two groups: low-productivity and high-productivity …rms within each industry. We then combine all low-(high-) productivity …rms from all industries as the low (high) productivity category. Table 4 shows the negative binomial estimates for the low productivity category in columns (1) and (2) and the high productivity category in columns (3) and (4). Columns (1) and (3) contain estimates without …xed e¤ects, and columns (2) and (4) contain estimates with two-way …xed e¤ects. The key coe¢ cients, namely, home and foreign tari¤s, are positive and signi…cant. That is, the low-productivity and high-productivity Chinese …rms adjust their export product scope in the same direction in response to tari¤ cuts. Firm heterogeneity in productivity does not matter in this regard.
[ Table 4 ]
Possible Endogeneity and Reverse Causality
The regressions shown in Table 3 have two potential endogeneity issues. We examine whether our main results reported in Table 3 are robust after these issues are considered.
The …rst endogeneity issue originates from the possible measurement errors of the two key explanatory variables, namely, HT it and F T it , in which we use the contemporary year's trade value to calculate the weight of each product's tari¤. This problem can be addressed in many ways, and we opt for a common approach in literature. Speci…cally, we avoid this possible endogeneity problem by using the following measure for our …rm-speci…c home tari¤s.
where the weight of domestic sales is from the previous year's sales (one-period lag in weight). The idea is that current tari¤s cannot a¤ect the previous export weight. The …xed-e¤ects estimates in column (1) of Table 5 indicate that home and foreign tari¤s remain positive and signi…cant.
Similarly, current foreign tari¤s may be strongly correlated with their corresponding exports. We hence construct foreign tari¤ as
Column (2) of Table 5 ) and re-run negative binomial regression in column (3) . We …nd that the qualitative results and foreign tari¤s (F T it ). 17 An alternative empirical identi…cation strategy is to use an instrument variable to address possible reverse causality. The last column of Table 5 shows the results of this task. We run the IV Poisson estimate where all variables are in one-period di¤erence. 18 Given that di¤erence estimates wipe out all unobserved …rm het- 1 7 There is another issue with respect to our use of current year tari¤ levels in the main model. Firms may not have su¢ cient time to adjust their export product scope to the tari¤ changes in the same year. To provide …rms su¢ cient time to respond to tari¤ changes, we can use the previous year's tari¤s instead of the current year's tari¤s. This is done in Table 5 . Hence, Table 5 serves two purposes. 1 8 The IV Poisson estimates implement a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator of Poisson regression and allow endogenous variables to be instrumented by excluded instruments. Poisson regression assumes that E(ejx) = exp(Xb) to obtain a consistent estimate of b; thus, it is appropriate for a wide variety of models where the dependent variable is non-negative (see, e.g., Mullahy, 1997; Nichols, 2007) . We thus eliminat observations with negative …rst-di¤erence of export scope from the sample. [ Table 5 ]
Summary and Issues
Two important results are obtained in this preliminary empirical analysis. These results deserve further investigation and understanding. First, we …nd that …rms adjust their export product scope similarly in response to home and foreign tari¤ cuts. However, these two types of tari¤ reduction have opposite e¤ects on the …rms.
As indicated in literature (e.g., Qiu and Zhou, 2013), bilateral trade liberalization poses both a threat and an opportunity to every …rm. A home tari¤ cut intensi…es domestic competition; this situation is not good home …rms. By contrast, a foreign tari¤ cut makes the domestic …rms' export more pro…table. This conventional wisdom does not clarify our …nding on Chinese …rms'export product scope adjustment.
Second, we …nd that …rms with di¤erent levels of productivity adjust their export product scope in the same direction in response to tari¤ cuts. However, recent literature on heterogeneous …rms suggests that high-productivity …rms normally behave di¤erently from low-productivity …rms.
We explore the two issues mentioned above by developing a theoretical model (in Section 3) and testing the predictions from the model (in Section 4).
Theoretical Model and Analysis
Our model consists of a world with two countries: China and Foreign. Each country has two industries, namely, the numeraire good industry and the di¤erentiated products industry. Di¤erentiated products are produced by a continuum of …rms with measure 1, and numeraire good is produced by atomic …rms.
Technologies
In China, every …rm in the di¤erentiated goods industry can produce multiple products. All …rms employ the same production technology but have di¤erent managerial capabilities. 19 On the production side, we suppose that a …rm produces a set of products with measure s. We index the …rm's core competency as product 0 and the others in descending productivity in [0; s]; this indexing captures the situation wherein products further away from the core competency become less productive. We let the unit cost of producing the ith product be c i = c + i, where > 0 captures the decline of productivity. The unit cost of producing the core competency is c. Introducing a product is costly. If a …rm introduces s products, a …xed cost equal to ks will exist, where k > 0.
On the management side, we assume that each …rm incurs a cost of managing sales in both domestic and foreign markets. We further assume that …rms are of two types: e¢ cient …rms that have unit management cost m l and ine¢ cient …rms that have unit management cost m h , with m h > m l . Let denote the fraction of e¢ cient …rms in the economy.
Given that our focus is on Chinese …rms, we simplify the situation for foreign …rms. We assume that a continuum of identical foreign …rms produce the di¤erentiated goods. All of them have the same marginal cost of production, which is assumed to be zero. Each …rm produces a single product. Managing sales has no cost, and product introduction has no …xed cost. The measure of foreign …rms is also assumed to be 1.
Product Markets
Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), we assume that Z identical consumers exist in China, with each having a quasi-linear preference for the numeraire good and all varieties from the di¤erentiated goods industry.
where ; , and are all positive constants; Q 0 is the consumption of the numeraire good; is the set of all varieties sold in the Chinese market; and q i is the consumption of variety i. A consumer maximizes her utility subject to a budget constraint. As a result, the market demand for variety i by all Z consumers is
q j dj Z q i , from which we obtain the demand function for variety i as
In the above demand function, p i is the price of variety i, M is the measure of , and P = R i2 p i di is the aggregate price of all varieties. Slope b is exogenous, but the intercept A is endogenous, depending on the degree of product substitution ( ) and the degree of product market competition (captured by the endogenous P and M ).
The set of varieties, , is large; thus, the seller of variety i regards himself as a small monopolist of variety i whose decision has no direct e¤ect on other products. 20 Competition in the market is captured completely by the vertical intercept of the demand function (A).
The foreign country also has Z consumers and the same demand structure as China. In particular, the demand function for variety i is
In this demand function, M is the measure of the set of varieties sold in the foreign market, which is denoted by F , and P = R i2 F p i di is the aggregate price of all varieties in the foreign market. We assume that tari¤s take the form of iceberg transport cost. We let t (> 1) and t (> 1) denote China's tari¤ and the foreign country's tari¤. Then, t units of a product must be produced by a foreign …rm to sell one unit in the Chinese market, and t units of a product must be produced by a Chinese …rm to sell one unit in the foreign market. Free trade exists in the numeraire good industry.
Firms'Decision
We …rst analyze the Chinese …rms'decisions. Each …rm takes A and A as given when making its decisions. The …rst focus is on the decision of an e¢ cient …rm. Because all Chinese …rms have the same production productivity, without loss of generality, we set c = 0 to reduce notation. Suppose that the …rm decides to introduce a range of products, [0; s l ], which is called the …rm's total product scope, and export a range of products [0; e l ], which is called the …rm's export product scope. 21 With consumer preference and market size (Z) in the two markets being the same, Chinese …rms have a disadvantage in the foreign market because they face trade protection in the foreign market. Hence, in equilibrium, a Chinese …rm will not introduce a product that is exported to the foreign market but not sold to the domestic market, that is, e l s l . If e l < s l , then some products (i 2 (e l ; s l ]) are sold in the domestic market but are not exported; the …rm's export products are a subset of its total products. This is the case when the …xed cost of product introduction (k) is not too large. Under this circumstance, the …rm's decision in the home market is expressed as
where Q = R s l 0 q i di is the total output of the …rm from all its products sold in the domestic market. 22 It is easy to derive the set of …rst order conditions, from which we obtain the optimal total product scope s l = A m l 2 p bk :
The total product scope is larger with stronger market demand (A), lower management cost (m l ), lower cost of product introduction (k), and gradual decline of productivity ( ). The optimal quantity, price, and pro…t of each product are, respectively,
A stronger demand (i.e., a larger A) leads to a larger output, a higher price and a larger pro…t. An increase in managerial e¢ ciency (i.e., a smaller m l ) increases output and pro…t, but reduces price.
Given e l < s l , the …rm's optimal decision in the foreign market is provided by
where Q = R e l 0 q i di is the aggregate quantity of the …rm's export from all its products. It is easy to derive the set of …rst order conditions, from which we obtain the optimal export product scope
The optimal quantity, price and pro…t of each export product for i 2 [0; e l ] are
The export product scope is larger with stronger market demand (A ), lower management cost (m l ), slower decline in productivity ( ), and lower foreign tari¤ (t ). An increase in managerial e¢ ciency (i.e., a smaller m l ) or a decrease in foreign tari¤ increases output and pro…t, but reduces price. Tougher competition (smaller A ) reduces pro…t.
The optimization of an ine¢ cient …rm is the same as that of an e¢ cient …rm. We merely replace m l with m h in all the expressions above. In particular, the optimal total product scope is
and the export product scope is
The output, price, and pro…t of product i in the domestic and foreign markets are, respectively,
and
We now analyze the foreign …rms. In the Chinese market, a foreign …rm chooses its quantity to maximize its pro…t (A bq f c )q f c tq f c , where subscript fc stands for a foreign …rm in the Chinese market. Thus, the optimal quantity, price, and pro…t of a foreign …rm in the Chinese market are, respectively,
In the foreign market, the foreign …rm chooses its output to maximize its pro…t (A bq f f )q f f , where subscript ¤ stands for a foreign …rm in the foreign market. The optimal quantity, price, and pro…t of a foreign …rm in the foreign market are, respectively,
Market Equilibrium
Lastly, we determine equilibrium A and A .
Given that A = + P M + , we …rst calculate M and P . M = s l + s h (1 ) + 1. From (9), we obtain the aggregate price of each e¢ cient Chinese …rm in the Chinese market as follows:
Similarly, each ine¢ cient Chinese …rm's aggregate price is p h = 1 2 (A + m h )s h + 1 4 s 2 h : Each foreign …rm's price in the Chinese market is given in (13) . Thus, the aggregate price in the Chinese market is
To simplify the notation, we let = 2 , m = m l + (1 )m h , andm = m 2 l + (1 )m 2 h . Using the results in A = + P M + yields the following condition that determines equilibrium A:
By substituting in s l from (8) and s h from (11) in the equation above, we obtain
Eliminating the negative-value solution, we obtain the unique solution to A as A = p a 0 (1 + ) + m;
where
In the foreign market, the total number of products sold is M = e l + (1 )e h + 1. The aggregate price of each e¢ cient Chinese exporter and that of each ine¢ cient Chinese exporter are, respectively,
Each foreign …rm's price is provided in (14) . Thus, the aggregate price in the foreign market is
Using the results in A = + P M + yields the following condition that determines the equilibrium A :
Substituting e l from (10) and e h from (12) in the equation above, we obtain the following equation that determines equilibrium A :
This condition yields equilibrium A (excluding the negative-value solution) as follows:
where a 0 = [(1 + ) t m] 2 m + 2 t :
In summary, equilibrium A provided in (16) , is a function of China's tari¤ t, and equilibrium A , given in (18) , is a function of foreign tari¤ t . Substituting A in (8) and (11), we obtain optimal total product scopes s l and s h , respectively, as a function of t. Substituting A in (10) and (12), we obtain optimal export product scopes e l and e h , respectively, as a function of t .
Trade Liberalization
We analyze the respective e¤ects of two types of trade liberalization on the export product scope of Chinese …rms. The …rst type of liberalization is tari¤ reduction in China (t), and the second type is tari¤ reduction in the foreign country (t ).
We …rst examine de l dt and de h dt . Based on the expression of e l from (10), e h from (12), and A from (18) and (19) , we immediately know that t does not have any direct e¤ect on e l and e h . However, the optimal export product scope given in (10) and (12) is obtained under the condition that e l < s l and e h < s h . The Chinese tari¤ cut may eventually result in the violation of this condition. From (8), (11) , (16) , and (17), we obtain
Hence, when a tari¤ cut is implemented in China, Chinese …rms reduce their total product scope (s l and s h ).
When tari¤ cuts are implemented continuously, the total product scope is eventually reduced to the level of the export product scope (e l and e h ). Once e l = s l , the optimal export product scope of e¢ cient Chinese …rms is no longer given in (10) , and once e h = s h , the optimal export product scope of ine¢ cient Chinese …rms is no longer given in (12) . Despite this complication, we prove in Appendix B that ds l dt = de l dt > 0 and ds h dt = de h dt > 0. We then discuss the e¤ect of foreign tari¤ cuts on Chinese …rms'export product scope. We prove in Appendix B that under certain conditions,
The above analysis allows us to establish the following proposition. (ii) Suppose that the management cost of high-e¢ ciency …rms is very low (i.e., m l is very small) and the fraction of high-e¢ ciency …rms is large. Then, in response to a tari¤ cut by the foreign country, Chinese …rms with high managerial e¢ ciency expand their export product scope, whereas those with low managerial e¢ ciency reduce their export product scope.
As indicated in the proof, the condition imposed on the second result is a su¢ cient but not necessary.
The results of the proposition are surprising. On the one hand, one may ask why a domestic tari¤ cut a¤ects export product scope. On the other hand, one may ask why some exporters are negatively a¤fected by a foreign tari¤ cut such that they have to reduce their export product scope. The explanation is as follows. With regard to domestic tari¤ cut, each …rm incurs a cost of introducing (or maintaining) every product it produces. By retaining a product, a …rm obtains pro…t from the market; however, discontinuing a product results in saving from …xed cost (k). When the domestic market is very pro…table, the pro…t from the domestic market alone can cover the …xed cost. In that case, e l < s l and lowering the Chinese tari¤ reduces a Chinese …rm's domestic market pro…t, which results in a reduction in total product scope but not in export product scope because the latter is only a¤ected by foreign market pro…tability. However, when a drastic tari¤ cut is implemented, the …rm reduces its product scope to a large extent that the set of products available for export is likewise reduced.
This is how domestic trade liberalization a¤ects exports.
A foreign tari¤ cut has a direct and an indirect e¤ect on Chinese exporters. Every …rm's marginal product earns zero pro…t from the foreign market. On the one hand, the foreign tari¤ cut lowers the cost of every exported product and thus increases pro…ts. The latter induces all …rms to expand their export product scope.
This phenomenon is the cost e¤ect, which is positive and direct. On the other hand, a low cost causes every …rm to reduce the prices of all its products, which increases competition (lowering A ). This competition e¤ect, which is negative and indirect, reduces the pro…ts of all products (including the marginal products) and tends to reduce every …rm's export product scope. The export product scope of a …rm is reduced or expanded depending on the net e¤ect on its marginal product. The competition e¤ect is the same for all products as it shifts down the demand intercept (A ). However, the cost e¤ect is di¤erent for the e¢ cient …rms and the ine¢ cient …rms.
An e¢ cient …rm's marginal product has a higher marginal cost of production (e l ) than that of an ine¢ cient …rm (e h ) because the marginal products of all …rms earn zero pro…t and the cost of a product is the sum of its management and production costs. A reduction in foreign tari¤ (in the form of iceberg transport cost) reduces all products'cost of production by the same percentage; thus, an e¢ cient …rm bene…ts more than an ine¢ cient …rm because the former enjoys a larger cost reduction in the absolute term. This is why under certain conditions, the net e¤ect is positive for e¢ cient …rms (the cost e¤ect is larger than the competition e¤ect) but negative for ine¢ cient …rms (the competition e¤ect is larger than the cost e¤ect).
Firm Heterogeneity in Production Productivity
The most interesting message from Proposition 1 is that when a tari¤ cut is implemented in the foreign country, Chinese …rms with di¤erent managerial e¢ ciency levels respond in opposite directions. In this section, we examine whether the heterogeneous response to foreign tari¤ cuts by …rms with di¤erent managerial e¢ ciency levels can be reinterpreted as by …rms with di¤erent production productivity levels, namely, the usual Melitz (2003) type of …rm heterogeneity. We make a few modi…cations to the main model. First, we assume that Chinese …rms are homogeneous in managerial e¢ ciency to obtain a clean result; for simplicity, we let m l = m h = 0. Second, Chinese …rms di¤er in production productivity. We assume that the cost of core competency c is uniformly distributed in [0; 1]. Third, we merely focus on equilibrium analysis in the foreign market.
The derivation of optimal export product scope is similar to that in the main model except for one di¤erence:
all equilibrium variables are functions of c: Suppose that a …rm has cost of core competence equal to c, called …rm c. Then, …rm c's optimal export product scope is
We assume that the foreign tari¤ is not too high or the foreign demand is su¢ ciently strong such that all Chinese …rms export to further simplify the analysis. This condition requires A > t which we assume to hold below.
The export quantity, price, and pro…t of …rm c's ith product are
Thus, the aggregate price of …rm c is given by
The aggregate price in the foreign market is given by
The number of products in the foreign market is given by
The above expressions of P and M , together with A = + P M + , allow us to solve for the equilibrium A as a function of t , expressed as A (t ). Substituting equilibrium A into the expression of optimal product scope (21), we obtain e(t ; c) = A (t ) t c :
is independent of c. That is, all …rms respond to the foreign tari¤ cut in the same direction. Our numerical example shows that de(t ;c) dt < 0. That is, in response to the foreign tari¤ cut, all Chinese …rms expand their export product scope.
One may ask why the result is di¤erent from Proposition 1, which is derived from the model with …rm heterogeneity in managerial e¢ ciency. In the main model, the two types of …rms have di¤erent production productivity levels for their marginal products; thus, foreign tari¤ reduction a¤ects them di¤erently. However, with homogeneity in managerial e¢ ciency and heterogeneity in production productivity, all …rms have the same production productivity for their marginal products. This condition can be seen by substituting (21) , which is independent of c. Thus, all …rms' marginal products will be a¤ected similarly.
Further Empirical Analysis: The Role of Managerial E¢ ciency
Guided by our theoretical analysis, we conduct an empirical investigation with emphasis on the responses of heterogenous …rms to foreign tari¤ cuts.
We …rst identify a measure of managerial e¢ ciency. We follow management science literature (e.g., Miller and Vollmann, 1985; Cooper and Kaplan, 1991; Fisher and Ittner, 1999) and use a …rm's overhead expenses to proxy for management costs. Speci…cally, we construct two indicators of managerial e¢ ciency for each …rm:
high overhead indicator (representing low managerial e¢ ciency) and low overhead indicator (representing high managerial e¢ ciency). We rank all …rms in each industry according to their overhead expenses (in logarithm).
When a …rm's overhead expenses is higher than the top 25 th quantile, the …rm has low managerial e¢ ciency;
its high overhead indicator takes the value one, and its low overhead indicator takes the value zero. Similarly, when a …rm's overhead expenses is lower than the bottom 25 th quantile, the …rm has high managerial e¢ ciency;
its high overhead indicator takes the value zero, and its low overhead indicator takes the value one. The low and high overhead indicators of …rms with overhead expenses between the 25 th and 75 th quantile are zero. We then pool …rms from all industries while maintaining the value of their indicators.
After introducing managerial e¢ ciency and distinguishing it from production productivity, we realize a problem in the TFP measure. The conventional measure of TFP, including our TFP1, is a Solow residual that includes both managerial e¢ ciency and production productivity. To clarify this, consider the following standard Cobb-Douglas gross production function
where Y it , K it , L it , M it , and x it are …rm i's sales, capital, labor, intermediate inputs, and productivity in year t,
respectively. 23 The conventional Olley-Pakes measure of productivity involves obtaining the di¤erence between log output and log factor inputs times their estimated coe¢ cients as follows:
In this approach, …rm productivity (TFP1) is clearly correlated with the ex-post productivity shock (" it ), such as managerial e¢ ciency.
We follow Feenstra et al. (2013) and construct an ex-ante productivity measure called TFP2 to exclude managerial e¢ ciency from our TFP measure. Suppose that investment V it in the Olley-Pakes approach depends on anticipated productivity T F P 2 it of the …rm according to the following functional relation: 
Appendix C provides a more detailed discussion on our TFP1 and TFP2 construction. Appendix Table A2 provides the industry-level estimates of the …rms'TFP1 and TFP2 in each industry, together with the associated coe¢ cients of labor, capital, and materials.
With the newly constructed TFP2, we consider the following speci…cation to include …rm heterogeneity in managerial e¢ ciency.
where foreign tari¤s appear three times in the equation: the foreign tari¤s itself, its interaction with the high overhead indicator (HO it ), and its interaction with the low overhead indicator (LO it ). Our theory predicts that^ 3 +^ 4 > 0 and^ 3 +^ 5 < 0 because high (low) management cost …rms reduces (increases) their scope in response to foreign tari¤ cuts. The regression results are shown in Table 6 .
[ Table 6 ]
As shown in column (1) of Table 6 , high-productivity …rms have larger export product scopes. Again, we …nd that both home and foreign tari¤ variables have positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients. More importantly, the interaction between foreign tari¤s and the high managerial e¢ ciency (i.e., low overhead) dummy is negative and signi…cant, with a much larger economic magnitude than the own coe¢ cient of foreign tari¤s.
This …nding indicates that the e¤ect of foreign tari¤s on export scope is negative (i.e., 0:003 0:752 < 0 in column (1)). Thus, a foreign tari¤ reduction increases the export product scope of high managerial e¢ ciency …rms. By contrast, the coe¢ cient of the interaction between foreign tari¤s and the low managerial e¢ ciency (i.e., high overhead) indicator is positive and signi…cant. Given that 0:003 + 0:698 > 0 as shown in column (1), a foreign tari¤ reduction reduces the export product scope fo low managerial e¢ ciency …rms. Middle managerial e¢ ciency …rms also reduce their export product scope (as indicated by the coe¢ cient value 0:003). By replacing …rm-speci…c home tari¤s with industry-level home tari¤s, we …nd that all results remain robust, as shown in column (2) of Table 6 .
We determine whether such key …ndings are sensitive to the measure of home input tari¤s. Similar to the above section, we divide the entire sample into two groups, with one less integrated into the GSCs and the other more integrated into the GSCs. As shown in columns (3) and (4), our key …ndings remain robust for the two groups: a foreign tari¤s reduction increases (decreases) the export scope of high (low) managerial e¢ ciency …rms.
Generally speaking, larger …rms also have higher overhead expenses, with other things equal (especially for equal managerial e¢ ciency). This observation suggests that "total overhead expenses" may not be an appropriate measure of managerial e¢ ciency. To avoid this size problem, we use overhead expenses per capita, which is de…ned as a …rm's total overhead expenses divided by the number of employees. By replacing total overhead expenses with overhead expenses per capita, we obtain the regression results shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 . 24 The qualitative aspects of the results are similar. In particular, the net impact of a foreign tari¤ cut on export product scope is negative for …rms with low overhead expenses (…rms with high managerial e¢ ciency) but positive for …rms with high overall expenses (…rms with low managerial e¢ ciency).
Lastly, we …nd that the qualitative result is not sensitive to the de…nition of managerial e¢ ciency. Suppose that we de…ne high managerial-e¢ ciency …rms as those with overhead expenses lower than the bottom 10 th quantile and low managerial-e¢ ciency …rms as those with overhead expenses higher than the 90 th quantile.
Then, re-running the regression yields the results reported in Table 7 .
[ Table 7 ]
Concluding Remarks
In this study, we conduct theoretical and empirical analyses on the e¤ects of one-sided tari¤ cuts on …rms' export product scope. The preliminary empirical analysis based on Chinese data shows that Chinese …rms reduce their export product scope in response to a domestic tari¤ cut and a foreign tari¤ cut. Low-productivity and high-productivity …rms behave similarly. We build a theoretical model to fully understand this phenomenon.
The novelty of our theoretical model is that it explicitly incorporates a new dimension of …rm heterogeneity, namely, managerial e¢ ciency. Our model predicts that the home country's tari¤ cut reduces all home …rms' export product scope; however, in response to a foreign country's tari¤ cut, a home …rm's export product scope expands (shrinks) when the …rm's management cost is low (high). We then conduct another empirical analysis and obtain strong evidence to support our theoretical predictions.
Firm heterogeneity in managerial e¢ ciency is the new element in our theoretical and empirical models. We verify the generality of our results based on our speci…cations of managerial e¢ ciency. In our theoretical model, we model a …rm's management cost as a linear function of its total sales. After checking, we …nd that the results also hold if a …rm's management cost is assumed as a quadratic function of total sales. It will be more convincing if we obtain the same results using a more general function of managerial e¢ ciency. Similarly, in our empirical analysis, we use a …rm's total overhead expenses and overhead expenses per capital as a proxy for a …rm's management cost. Although this is a common measure of management cost in literature, it would be interesting to explore other measures to con…rm the robustness of our results.
[43] Tre ‡er, Daniel (2004), "The Long and Short of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement," American Economic Review 94(4), pp. 870-895.
[44] Yu, Miaojie (2013), "Processing Trade, Firm Productivity, and Tari¤ Reductions: Evidence from Chinese Firms," Economic Journal, forthcoming.
[45] Yu, Miaojie and Wei Tian (2012), "China's Processing Trade: A Firm-Level Analysis,"in Huw McMay and Ligang Song (eds.) Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China, Australian National University E-press, pp. 111-48. (2) report the mean and standard deviation of 3-digit industry-level home import tari¤s whereas columns (3)-(4) report …rm-level home import tari¤s as described in Eq. (2) . Columns (5)-(6) report the mean and standard deviation of …rm-level foreign tari¤s as described in Eq.(3). The last two columns report the mean and standard deviation of …rm input tari¤s as described in Eq. (4) in the text. Note: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the …rm level in parentheses. *,**,*** indicates signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Pure processing …rms are dropped in all columns. Pure domestic …rms and pure exporting …rms are dropped from all estimates. Columns (1)-(4) are negative binomial …xed-e¤ects estimates whereas column (5) is the …rst-di¤erence poisson IV estimate where the regressand and regressors are in …rst-di¤erence level. The second-di¤erence …rm-level home tari¤s and foreign tari¤s are used as instruments for …rst-di¤erence …rm-level home tari¤s and foreign tari¤s. Table A1 , the annual number of observations is more than 10 million in 2000 and 16 million in 2006, with more than 118 million in total for seven years. Column (2) of Table  A1 exhibits that there are 286,819 …rms that ever engage in international trade during this period.
For each transaction, the dataset consists of three types of information: (1) 5 variables on basic trade information. They are value (in current US dollar), trade status (export or import), quantity, trade unit, value per unit (i.e., value divided by quantity). (2) 6 variables on trade mode and pattern. These include country of destination for exports, country of origin for imports, routing (i.e., whether the product is shipped through an intermediate country/regime), customs regime (e.g., processing trade or ordinary trade), trade mode (i.e., by sea, by truck, by air, or by post), customs port (i.e., where the product departs or arrives). (3) Firms'information associated with each transaction. In particular, it includes 7 variables such as …rm's name, identi…cation number set by the customs, city where the …rm is located, telephone, zip code, name of the manager/CEO, ownership type of …rm (e.g., foreign a¢ liate, private, or state-own-enterprises).
A.2. Firm-Level Production Dataset
The On average, the total value of industrial production covered in such a dataset accounts for around 95% of China's total industrial production in each year. In fact, the aggregated data on the industrial sector in China's Statistical Yearbook published by the Natural Bureau of Statistics (NBS) are compiled from this dataset. The dataset includes more than 100 …nancial variables listed in the main accounting sheets of all these …rms. It covers two types of manufacturing …rms: (1) all SOEs; (2) non-SOEs whose annual sales are more than …ve million RMB. The number of …rms increased from more than 160 thousand in 2000 to 301 thousand in 2006. As shown in column (3) of Table A1 , the total number of …rms that ever appear in the dataset during 2000-2006 is 615,951.
The raw production dataset is still quite noisy given that many unquali…ed …rms are included, largely because of mis-reporting by some …rms. For example, information on some family-based …rms, which usually have no formal accounting system in place, is based on a unit of one RMB, whereas the o¢ cial requirement is a unit of 1000 RMB. We hence …lter the raw production data as introduced in the text. Accordingly, the total number of …rms covered in the dataset is reduced to 438,165, around 1/3 of …rms are dropped from the sample after such a …lter process. As shown in column (4) of Table A1 , such a …lter ratio is even higher in the initial years: around 1/2 of …rms are dropped in 2000.
A.3. Matching Method
Although these two datasets have rich information on production and trade, it is challenging to match them. Although both datasets contain a variable of each …rm's identi…cation number, their coding systems are completely di¤erent and share no common characteristics. For example, the lengths of the …rm's ID variable in transaction-level dataset are 10 digits whereas those in …rm-levels only have 9 digits. China's customs administration just constructs a complete coding system di¤erent from the one adopted by the National Bureau of Statistics.
To address this challenge, we take two approaches to match transaction-level trade data and …rm-level production data. First, we match the two datasets by …rm's name and year. That is, if a …rm from one dataset has exactly the same Chinese name as a …rm in another dataset in a particular year, they must be the same …rm. The year variable is necessary to use for an auxiliary identi…cation variable since some …rms could change their name in di¤erent years and new comers could possibly take other …rms'original names. As a result, the number of matched …rms is 83,679 in total by using the raw production dataset, and reduced to 69,623 in total by using the more accurate …ltered production dataset.
Second, we rely on two other common variables to further identify …rms, namely, zip code and the last seven digits of a …rm's phone number. The rationale is that …rms should have di¤erent and unique phone numbers within a postal district. Although this method seems straightforward, subtle technical and practical di¢ culties still remain. For example, the phone numbers in the product-level trade data include both area phone codes and a hyphen, whereas those in the …rm-level production data do not. We use the last seven digits of the phone number to serve a proxy for …rm identi…cation for two reasons. The …rst reason is that during 2000-2006, some large Chinese cities changed their phone number digits from seven to eight, which usually added one more digit at the beginning of the number. Therefore, sticking to the last seven digits of the number would not confuse the …rm's identi…cation. The second reason is that in the original dataset, phone number is de…ned as a string of characters with the phone zip code. However, it is inappropriate to de-string such characters to numerals since a hyphen bar is used to connect the zip code and phone number. Using the last seven-digit substring solves this problem neatly.
A …rm could miss its name information in either trade or production dataset. Similarly, a …rm could lose information on phone and/or zip code. To secure that our matched dataset can cover common …rms as many as possible, we include the observations in the matched dataset if a …rm appears in either one of the two approaches just described above. As a result, the number of matched …rms increases to 90,558 when the raw production dataset is used, as shown in column (7) of Table A1 . By way of comparison, such a matching performance is in the same magnitude to (or even better than) other similar studies (See Yu (2013) for detailed discussions). (ii). We now turn to foreign tari¤ cuts.
) (s
Noting that at the equilibrium A is a function of t , i.e., A (t ). Then, from (10) and (12), we have: 
Let us …rst consider a limiting case in which m l = 0 (the managerial e¢ ciency is very high for the e¢ cient Chinese …rms) and = 1 (the measure of ine¢ cient Chinese …rms is zero). Then, the equilibrium A from (18) becomes A = This allows us to establish a non-empty interval V = (A t dA dt ; A ). We now assign m h any value such that m h 2 V so that the ine¢ cient …rms (with measure zero) still export some varieties. Hence, we have m h > A t dA dt > m l = 0;
which satis…es the condition in (27) and so de h dt > 0 > de l dt . By continuity, the inequalities hold as long as m l is su¢ ciently small and the fraction of ine¢ cient Chinese …rms is su¢ ciently small. Q.E.D.
Appendix C: Measuring Ex-ante TFP (TFP2)
This section discusses how we construct and measure TFP using two di¤erent approaches: ex-post TFP (TFP1) and ex-ante TFP (TFP2) inspired by Feenstra et al. (2013) .
We extend the Olley-Pakes (1996) approach to …t with China's reality in the following ways. Firstly, given that the measure of TFP requires real terms of …rm's inputs (labor and capital) and output, we adopt di¤erent price de ‡ators for inputs and outputs from Brandt et al. (2012) in which the output de ‡ators are constructed using "reference price" information from China's Statistical Yearbooks whereas input de ‡ators are constructed based on output de ‡ators and China's national input-output table (2002) .
Secondly, we take China's WTO accession in 2001 into account since such a positive demand shock would push Chinese …rms to expand their economic scales, which in turn can exaggerate the simultaneous bias of their measured TFP. Thirdly, it is essential to construct the real investment variable when using the Olley-Pakes (1996) approach. As usual, we adopt the perpetual inventory method to investigate the law of motion for real capital and real investment. Di¤erent from assigning an arbitrary number for the depreciation ratio, we use the exact …rm's real depreciation provided by the Chinese …rm-level data set.
Finally, we also consider …rm's processing behavior in the TFP realization by constructing a processing export indicator (one denotes processing export and zero otherwise). The idea is that processing …rms may use di¤erent technology than non-processing …rms (Feenstra and Hanson, 2005) .
Thus, a …rm's investment function is V it = g 1 (x it ; ln K it ; EX it ; P E it ; W T O t ) where EX it (P E it ) is the export (processing export) indicator to measure whether …rm i exports (engages in processing exports) in year t, and W T O t is an indicator that equals one if the WTO agreement has occurred after 2001 and zero before that. Therefore, inverting the investment function with respect to its …rst argument we obtain: 25
Given the gross production function ln Y it = k ln K it + l ln L it + m ln M it + x it + " it (29) and de…ning the function g 2 ( ) as k ln K jt + g 1 1 (V it ; ln K it ; EX it ; P E it ; W T O t ), the estimation of the labor (materials) coe¢ cients l ( m ) are obtained as: ln Y it = l ln L it + m ln M it + g 2 (V it ; ln K it ; EX it ; P E it ; W T O t ) + " it :
The next step is to obtain an unbiased estimated coe¢ cient of k . Olley-Pakes (1996) use the following speci…cation:
ln Y it ^ l ln L it ^ m ln M it = k ln K it + E(x it jx it 1 ; pr it ) + [x it E(x it jx it 1 ; pr it )] + " it ;
where the estimated values of the labor coe¢ cient and materials coe¢ cient are used on the left. The expectation of productivity appearing in (31) is modeled as a forth-order polynomial function of lagged productivity, which can be obtained as (g 2i;t 1 k ln K i;t 1 ), and also the predicted probability of the …rm's survival into the year t, pr it ; based on year t 1 information. The predicted probability is obtained from Probit estimation. 26 The term [x it E(x it jx it 1 ; pr it )] is the productivity shock for surviving …rms, but does not a¤ect the investment or exit choice so it is treated as an error.
Once the coe¢ cient of capital^ k is estimated in Eq. (31), it is ready to obtain the standard ex-post TFP:
In this way, TFP1 includes both true production productivity and managerial e¢ ciency. By contrast, the ex-ante productivity (TFP2) which only capture true production productivity is given by T F P 2 it = g 1 1 (V it ; ln K it ; EX it ; P E it ; W T O t ): 2 5 Olley and Pakes (1996) show that the investment demand function is monotonically increasing in the productivity shock x jt , by making some mild assumptions about the …rm's production technology. 2 6 Note that here the non-linear least squares approach is adopted to estimate (31) since it requires the estimated coe¢ cients of the log-capital in the …rst and second term to be identical (Pavcnik, 2002). (40), Measuring instrument (41) , and Manufacture of artwork (42) . We do not report standard errors for each coe¢ cient to save space though available upon request. The logarithm of …rm productivity for Chinese …rms (TFP1 and TFP2) is estimated by industry by the augmented Olley-Pakes approach introduced in the text. Coe¢ cients of labor, capital, and materials are calculated at the sectoral average whereas TFP1 and TFP2 is measured at …rm-level using …rm-level output, capital, labor, and materials,respectively. The last two columns report log of …rm's overhead expenses and per-capita overhead expenses.
